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DOCUMENT 4

The International Filing Package

A citizens' petition and appeal to European, United Nations and United States institutions
*Dokumenti 4 — Paketa Ndërkombëtare e Parashtresës · Peticion qytetar dhe apel drejtuar institucioneve të BE-së,
Kombeve të Bashkuara dhe Shteteve të Bashkuara*

From the Albanian people — of Albania, Kosovo, and the diaspora
Nga populli shqiptar — i Shqipërisë, Kosovës dhe diasporës

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This package is drafted to the evidentiary standard required by the bodies it addresses: every factual assertion about the state is anchored to a public source, and blanks are left where the initiative's own case register is to be inserted. Names of specific individuals are not alleged as wrongdoers except where a public authority (court, prosecutor, or a named international body) has already done so on the record. Statuti redaktues — draft pune për diskutim e miratim.

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Part A — Master Petition

Pjesa A — Peticioni Kryesor

This is the shared instrument. It states who the petitioners are, what they allege, the evidence on which they rely, and what they request. The tailored cover-appeals in Part B attach this master petition to each institution and translate the request into that body's mandate.

Ky është instrumenti i përbashkët. Ai thotë kush janë parashtruesit, çfarë pohojnë, mbi cilat prova mbështeten, dhe çfarë kërkojnë. Apelet e posaçme në Pjesën B ia bashkëngjisin këtë peticion secilit institucion.

A.1 The petitioners

A.1 Parashtruesit

We, citizens of the Republic of Albania and of the Republic of Kosovo, together with Albanians of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Greece and of the worldwide diaspora, submit this petition of our own sovereign initiative. We act as citizens, not on behalf of any political party, and the initiative is expressly non-partisan.

Ne, qytetarë të Republikës së Shqipërisë dhe të Republikës së Kosovës, së bashku me shqiptarët e Maqedonisë së Veriut, Malit të Zi, Greqisë dhe të diasporës anembanë botës, e parashtrojmë këtë peticion me nismën tonë sovranë. Veprojmë si qytetarë, jo në emër të ndonjë partie; nisma është shprehimisht jopartiake.

A.2 Summary of the request

A.2 Përmbledhje e kërkesës

We ask the competent European, United Nations and United States institutions to **recognise, monitor and lawfully anchor** a peaceful, citizen-led constitutional renewal in Albania — a new constitution written by citizens and experts and adopted directly by the people through a binding referendum — and to examine the record of systematic corruption and state capture that has driven the impoverishment and mass emigration of the Albanian people. We seek recognition, oversight and the review of legality; we do not ask any body to replace a domestic legal procedure or to substitute for the vote of the people.

U kërkojmë institucioneve kompetente të BE-së, OKB-së dhe SHBA-së të njohin, të mbikëqyrin dhe të ankorojnë ligjërisht një rinisje kushtetuese paqësore të udhëhequr nga qytetarët, dhe të shqyrtojnë korrupsionin sistematik e kapjen e shtetit që ka shkaktuar varfërimin dhe eksodin e popullit shqiptar. Kërkojmë njohje, mbikëqyrje dhe shqyrtim ligjshmërie — jo zëvendësim të procedurës së brendshme, as të votës së popullit.

A.3 The grievance: thirty-five years of state capture

A.3 Ankesa: tridhjetë e pesë vjet kapje e shtetit

For thirty-five years the successor parties of the one-party state have governed, in the assessment of this initiative, against the interest of the citizen — treating the people as subjects rather than as the sovereign. The problem is not merely bad government; it is the way the system was built. Public posts, tenders and licences have been distributed on the basis of political loyalty rather than merit; public wealth has been captured; and an entire generation has been forced to leave. This petition connects that internal capture to a peaceful, lawful and internationally-anchored remedy.

Për tridhjetë e pesë vjet, sipas vlerësimit të kësaj nisme, partitë pasardhëse të shtetit njëpartiak e kanë qeverisur popullin kundër interesit të tij — duke e trajtuar qytetarin si nënshtetas e jo si sovran. Problemi nuk është thjesht keqqeverisja; është vetë mënyra si u ndërtua sistemi.

A.4 The evidentiary case

A.4 Çështja provuese

We rely, for the systemic claims, on the public record of the very institutions we address. In summary:

1. **Persistent rule-of-law and corruption concerns.** The European Commission's 2024 report on Albania records both progress and serious residual problems: while the vetting of judges and prosecutors is near completion (794 of 805 cases closed at first instance), a broad criminal amnesty led to 40 individuals convicted by the Special

Anti-Corruption courts (SPAK) being fully pardoned and 65 others having their sentences reduced — and the Commission flags continued attempted political interference with the judiciary. [1]

2. **Structural corruption-prevention gaps.** GRECO's Fifth Round Evaluation Report on Albania documents concrete failures in preventing corruption among persons with top executive functions and in law enforcement — among them the absence of ministerial integrity plans, weak conflict-of-interest and lobbying rules, political advisers operating without transparency, and integrity risks in the State Police. [2]
3. **An early, foundational plunder.** The 1996–1997 collapse of the pyramid schemes destroyed savings with a nominal value of roughly USD 1.2 billion — on the order of half of GDP — and the ensuing unrest of 1997 cost approximately 2,000 lives. It set the template for three decades in which power served the strong, not the citizen. [3]
4. **A recognised anti-corruption instrument, applied to Albania.** The United States has publicly designated Albanian political figures for “significant corruption” under Section 7031(c) of its appropriations law — demonstrating that the conduct at issue is recognised, on the record, by a state partner. [4]

Mbështetemi, për pohimet sistemike, mbi të dhënat publike të vetë institucioneve që u drejtohem: Raporti i Komisionit Evropian 2024, Raporti i Raundit të Pestë i GRECO-s, kolapsi i piramidave 1996–1997, dhe përcaktimet publike të SHBA-së sipas nenit 7031(c). Referencat [1]–[4] janë në Pjesën C.

A.5 The human cost — the demographic collapse

A.5 Kostoja njerëzore — rrënimi demografik

The cost is measured in people, not words. Albania's historical peak was **3,182,417 residents in 1989**. Had the population then grown at a normal natural rate (about 2% per year), the initiative projects it should number roughly **6.2 million today**. Instead, the initiative estimates the real resident population at about **1.8 million** — while the official 2023 census records 2,402,113. The difference between the projection (≈6.2M) and the real population (≈1.8M) is the calculated human loss: an exodus of up to **~4.4 million**.

1989 — maksimumi historik	Sot — projeksion (≈2%/vit)	Sot — reale (regjistrimi zyrtar: 2.4M)	Eksodi — humbja e llogaritur
3.18M	≈ 6.2M	≈ 1.8M	– 4.4M

Projeksioni (≈6.2M) – popullsia reale (≈1.8M) = deri në ~4.4 milionë të humbur. · Projection (≈6.2M) – real population (≈1.8M) = up to ~4.4 million lost.

Two figures anchor this and must be kept distinct. The **documented census loss** — about 780,000 residents since 1989 (–429,628, or –15.2%, since the 2011 census) — is hard fact. [5] The **~4.4 million exodus** is the initiative's analytical projection (≈6.2M expected minus ≈1.8M real), presented as such. A country that empties on this scale is producing evidence about its system, not merely losing a debate.

Kostoja matet me njerëz, jo me fjalë. Maksimumi ynë historik ishte 3,182,417 banorë në vitin 1989. Po të ishte rritur popullsia me një ritëm natyror normal (rreth 2% në vit), sipas projeksionit të nismës sot duhej të ishim rreth 6.2 milionë; nisma vlerëson se popullsia reale sot është rreth 1.8 milionë, ndërsa regjistrimi zyrtar i 2023-shit shënon 2,402,113. Diferenca mes projeksionit (≈6.2M) dhe popullsisë reale (≈1.8M) — deri në ~4.4 milionë — është eksodi, humbja njerëzore e llogaritur. Humbja e dokumentuar e regjistrimit (~780 mijë që nga 1989) është fakt; eksodi ~4.4 milionë është projeksioni analitik i nismës. Ne nuk po humbasim një debat — po humbasim vetë popullin tonë.

A.6 Our requests

A.6 Kërkesat tona

We respectfully request that the competent institutions, each within its mandate:

1. Recognise, on the record, that for thirty-five years successive governments have — in the citizens' assessment — governed against the public interest, amounting to an economic subjugation of the citizen and a systematic weakening of economic and social rights and of the rule of law;
2. Provide a technical opinion on the legality of a citizens' constitutional-renewal route through a popular-initiative referendum, consistent with popular sovereignty (Article 2) and Article 150 of the Constitution in force, and with the European Convention on Human Rights;

3. Monitor and accompany the process from the outset — constitution-drafting, the referendum, and any transitional arrangements — to guarantee it is lawful, transparent, peaceful and free from capture;
4. Guarantee an independent, transparent referendum organised by the Central Election Commission (CEC), with real-time verification of signatures, equal media access, and the possibility of diaspora and electronic voting to international best practice;
5. Examine the documented record of corruption and state capture set out in Part C, and act each within its own competence (rule-of-law conditionality, anti-corruption review, human-rights review, or targeted-measures screening).

Kërkojmë: (1) njohjen zyrtare të nënshtrimit ekonomik e shkeljeve sistematike; (2) opinion teknik mbi ligjshmërinë e rrugës kushtetuese me referendum me nismë qytetare (neni 2 e neni 150); (3) monitorim të procesit që në fillim; (4) referendum të pavarur e transparent nga KQZ me votim të diasporës; (5) shqyrtim të dosjes së korrupsionit në Pjesën C.

A.7 Legality and peaceful character

A.7 Ligjshmëria dhe karakteri paqësor

This is a peaceful, lawful and documented process. Nothing enters into force without the people's vote in a binding referendum. The initiative anchors the route in the sovereignty of the people (Article 2) and the popular-initiative referendum (Article 150) of the Constitution in force, submits any transitional measure to the prior review of the Venice Commission, and commits expressly to the European Convention on Human Rights, to political pluralism and to the Copenhagen criteria. It is not a coup, not a state of exception, and not a change of leaders — it is a change of foundations, decided by citizens.

Ky është proces paqësor, i ligjshëm dhe i dokumentuar. Asgjë nuk hyn në fuqi pa votën e popullit në referendum të detyrueshëm. Çdo masë kalimtare i nënshtrohet shqyrtimit paraprak të Komisionit të Venecias; nisma përkushtohet shprehimisht ndaj KEDNJ-së, pluralizmit dhe kriterëve të Kopenhagenit.

A.8 Declaration of the petitioners

A.8 Deklarata e parashtruesve

Signed, with respect and resolve — the Albanian people: of Albania and Kosovo, of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece, and of the diaspora across the world. Signatures are gathered and verified at ia-see.com/peticioni; the four founding documents are public at ia-see.com/lexo.

Nënshkruar, me respekt dhe vendësmëri — Populli Shqiptar. Nënshkrimet mblidhen dhe verifikohen te ia-see.com/peticioni; katër dokumentet themeluese janë publike te ia-see.com/lexo.

Part B — Tailored Cover-Appeals

Pjesa B — Apele të Posaçme

Each cover-appeal below is a short transmittal that attaches the master petition (Part A) and the dossier (Part C), addressed to one body and framed to its mandate and intake. Where a body reviews states rather than receiving citizen petitions, the appeal is styled as a *stakeholder / civil-society submission* rather than as a complaint.

Secili apel më poshtë është një shkresë përcjellëse që bashkëngjit petitionin kryesor (Pjesa A) dhe dosjen (Pjesa C), drejtuar një organi të vetmë dhe formular sipas mandatit të tij.

B.1 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)

Komisioni Evropian për Demokraci përmes së Drejtës (Komisioni i Venecias)

Addressed to: The President and members of the Venice Commission, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

As citizens of a Council of Europe member state, we respectfully ask the Commission for a technical opinion on the legality, under the Constitution in force and European standards, of a citizen-initiated constitutional-renewal route culminating in a binding popular-initiative referendum (Articles 2 and 150), and on the design of any transitional caretaker arrangement so that it remains lawful, proportionate and time-limited. We ask the Commission to accompany the constitution-drafting process so that its legality is assured from the first step.

Si qytetarë të një shteti anëtar të Këshillit të Evropës, kërkojmë një opinion teknik mbi ligjshmërinë e rrugës kushtetuese me nismë qytetare dhe referendum të detyrueshëm (nenet 2 e 150), dhe mbi dizajnin e çdo qeverie teknike kalimtare.

We ask for: a technical opinion on legality and on transitional design, and ongoing accompaniment of the drafting process.

B.2 Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)

Grupi i Shteteve kundër Korrupsionit (GRECO)

Addressed to: The President and Executive Secretary of GRECO, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

Building on GRECO's own Fifth Round findings for Albania — on the prevention of corruption among persons with top executive functions and in law enforcement — we submit the documented record in Part C and ask that the systemic pattern of political-loyalty distribution of posts, tenders and licences be reflected in GRECO's evaluation and compliance monitoring, and that the constitutional remedy proposed (criminalisation of patronage, mandatory merit-based recruitment, real-time fiscal transparency) be assessed against GRECO standards.

Duke u mbështetur te gjetjet e Raundit të Pestë të GRECO-s për Shqipërinë, parashtrojmë dosjen në Pjesën C dhe kërkojmë që modeli sistematik i ndarjes së posteve mbi baza besnikërie të pasqyrohet në vlerësimin e monitorimin e GRECO-s.

We ask GRECO to: reflect the documented pattern in its evaluation/compliance work and assess the proposed anti-capture safeguards against its standards.

B.3 European Commission — DG NEAR and the accession process

Komisioni Evropian — DG NEAR dhe procesi i anëtersimit

Addressed to: The Commissioner for Enlargement and the Director-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), Brussels.

Albania is a candidate country, and the rule of law is the backbone of accession. We ask the Commission to treat the citizens' constitutional-renewal initiative and the documented record of state capture within the fundamentals cluster and the annual reporting cycle, and to make clear — as its own 2024 report begins to — that reversals such as the amnesty of SPAK-convicted persons weigh directly on accession progress. Recognition and monitoring by the Commission would anchor the process in the accession conditionality the citizens support.

Shqipëria është vend kandidat dhe sundimi i ligjit është shtylla e anëtersimit. Kërkojmë që nisma qytetare dhe dosja e kapjes së shtetit të trajtohen brenda grupit të themeleve dhe cikllit vjetor të raportimit.

We ask DG NEAR to: reflect the initiative and the documented reversals in the accession reporting and fundamentals dialogue.

B.4 PACE and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights

PACE dhe Komisioneri i Këshillit të Evropës për të Drejtat e Njeriut

Addressed to: The President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the Commissioner for Human Rights, Strasbourg.

We ask the Assembly and the Commissioner to take note of the economic and social-rights dimension of state capture in Albania — the impoverishment of citizens below a living income and the mass emigration it drives — and to consider the matter within their monitoring, reporting and country-dialogue functions, in line with Article 11 ECHR (freedom of association) and the pluralism the initiative expressly protects.

Kërkojmë që Asambleja dhe Komisioneri të marrin në konsideratë dimensionin e të drejtave ekonomike e sociale të kapjes së shtetit dhe varfërimin nën minimumin jetik, brenda funksioneve të tyre të monitorimit.

We ask PACE / the Commissioner to: take note within monitoring and country-dialogue, with attention to economic and social rights.

B.5 UN Human Rights Council — Universal Periodic Review

Këshilli i OKB-së për të Drejtat e Njeriut — Rishikimi Periodik Universal (UPR)

Addressed to: The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UPR Branch, Geneva.

We submit this package as a stakeholder / civil-society contribution to Albania's Universal Periodic Review, documenting the systematic weakening of economic and social rights and the capture of the state, and inviting recommendations to the State on anti-corruption, merit-based public administration, and the protection of citizens against impoverishment and forced emigration.

E parashtrojmë këtë paketë si kontribut i shoqërisë civile për Rishikimin Periodik Universal të Shqipërisë, duke dokumentuar shkeljen sistematike të të drejtave ekonomike e sociale.

We submit for: inclusion as a UPR stakeholder submission ahead of Albania's next review cycle.

B.6 UN Special Rapporteurs (extreme poverty; migrants; corruption / IFFs)

Raportuesit Special të OKB-së (varfëria ekstreme; emigrantët; korrupsioni / flukset e paligjshme)

Addressed to: The Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights; the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants; and the mandates addressing corruption and illicit financial flows, OHCHR, Geneva.

We invite a joint communication to the State on the human-rights consequences of state capture: impoverishment below a living income, and emigration driven by the absence of merit-based opportunity. We ask the mandate-holders to seek information from the Government and, where warranted, to address the matter in country reporting and communications.

Ftojme një komunikim të përbashkët drejtuar shtetit për pasojat në të drejtat e njeriut: varfërimi nën minimumin jetik dhe emigrimi i detyruar.

We ask the mandate-holders to: consider a joint communication and country reporting on the documented harms.

B.7 UNCAC review mechanism and UN treaty bodies (ICCPR / ICESCR)

Mekanizmi i rishikimit të UNCAC dhe organet e traktateve (ICCPR / ICESCR)

Addressed to: The UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism (UNODC, Vienna) and the relevant UN treaty bodies (Human Rights Committee; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).

As Albania is party to the UN Convention against Corruption and to the ICCPR and ICESCR, we submit the documented record for the review of implementation, and for the treaty bodies' consideration of the economic and social-rights impact of systemic corruption on the population.

Meqenëse Shqipëria është palë e UNCAC-ut dhe e ICCPR/ICESCR, parashtrojmë dosjen për rishikimin e zbatimit dhe për shqyrtimin e ndikimit në të drejtat ekonomike e sociale.

We submit for: the implementation review and treaty-body consideration.

B.8 United States — State Department, Helsinki Commission, Global Magnitsky

Shtetet e Bashkuara — Departamenti i Shtetit, Komisioni Helsinki, Global Magnitsky

Addressed to: The U.S. Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor); the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission); and the interagency Global Magnitsky / Section 7031(c) processes.

The United States has publicly recognised significant corruption by Albanian political figures under Section 7031(c). We respectfully bring the documented record to the Department's annual human-rights reporting, invite the Helsinki Commission's attention as the body monitoring OSCE commitments (including democratic governance and the rule of law), and ask that credible, evidenced cases in the register be considered under the appropriate anti-corruption designation authorities. We stress that designations are matters for the U.S. Government on its own evidence; we provide sourced material, not conclusions.

SHBA-të kanë njohur publikisht korrupsion të rëndë të figurave politike shqiptare sipas nenit 7031(c). Sjellim dosjen e dokumentuar për raportimin vjetor, për vemëndjen e Komisionit Helsinki, dhe për shqyrtim sipas autoriteteve përkatëse.

We ask the U.S. bodies to: consider the record in human-rights reporting, OSCE-commitment monitoring, and anti-corruption screening, on the Government's own evidence.

Part C — Corruption & State-Capture Dossier

Pjesa C — Dosja e Korrupsionit dhe Kapjes së Shtetit

C.1 Method and sourcing standard

C.1 Metoda dhe standardi i burimeve

This dossier follows one rule: every factual assertion about the conduct of the state or of a named person is tied to a public, verifiable source — an international institution's report, a court judgment or prosecutor's act, a governmental designation, or credible reporting. Where the initiative's own register of cases (up to 111) contains matters not yet in the public record, they are entered in the template at C.4 with their evidence, and are not asserted as established fact until sourced. This is not caution for its own sake: it is the standard the Venice Commission, GRECO and the UN bodies require, and the standard that makes the dossier usable rather than dismissible.

Kjo dosje ndjek një rregull: çdo pohim faktik lidhet me një burim publik e të verifikueshëm. Rastet e regjistrit të nismës (deri 111) që ende nuk janë publike, futen në shabllonin C.4 me provat e tyre dhe nuk pohohen si fakt derisa të burimohen.

C.2 Documented systemic findings

C.2 Gjetje sistematike të dokumentuara

The following are on the public record and stand independently of any individual case:

- **Reform with reversals (EC 2024).** Vetting of judges and prosecutors near completion (794/805 first instance); SPAK securing convictions of high-level officials; but a broad amnesty pardoned 40 SPAK-convicted persons and reduced 65 sentences, and political interference with the judiciary persists. [1]
- **Corruption-prevention gaps (GRECO, 5th round).** No ministerial integrity plans; weak conflict-of-interest, gift and lobbying rules; political advisers without transparency; integrity and politicisation risks in the State Police. [2]
- **Foundational plunder (1996–97).** Pyramid schemes with a nominal value near USD 1.2 billion (~half of GDP) collapsed; the 1997 unrest cost ~2,000 lives. [3]
- **Recognised significant corruption (US, 2021).** The U.S. State Department publicly designated a former Prime Minister under Section 7031(c) for significant corruption; the associated persona-non-grata status was later lifted in 2026 — both facts are stated here for accuracy. [4]
- **Demographic collapse (INSTAT census).** Resident population 3,182,417 (1989) → 2,402,113 (2023); -429,628 (-15.2%) since 2011; emigration the principal driver. [5]

C.3 The human cost — demographic analysis

C.3 Kostoja njerëzore — analiza demografike

Two figures must be kept distinct so that neither can be attacked. (1) The documented census fact: the resident population fell from 3,182,417 (1989) to 2,402,113 (2023) — a loss of about 780,000, of which 429,628 (-15.2%) since 2011. (2) The initiative's model of the exodus: from the 1989 peak of ~3.18M, natural growth of ~2%/year would project ~6.2M residents today; the initiative estimates the real resident population at ~1.8M; the difference, ~6.2M - ~1.8M, is up to ~4.4 million lost. The census loss is documented fact; the ~4.4M exodus is a modelled estimate, presented as such. Both point the same way — a country losing its people.

Dy shifra duhet të mbahen të ndara: (1) fakti i regjistrimit — popullsia ra nga 3,182,417 (1989) në 2,402,113 (2023), humbje ~780 mijë, nga të cilat 429,628 (-15.2%) që nga 2011; dhe (2) modeli i nismës për eksodin — nga maksimumi ~3.18M i 1989-ës, rritja natyrore ~2%/vit do të projektonte ~6.2M sot; popullsia reale vlerësohet ~1.8M; diferenca ~6.2M - ~1.8M është deri në ~4.4 milionë të humbur. Humbja e regjistrimit është fakt; eksodi ~4.4M është vlerësim i modeluar.

C.4 Register of cases — template (to be populated)

C.4 Regjistri i rasteve — shablloni (për t'u plotësuar)

This is the structured register for the initiative's up-to-111 cases. Each row must carry a public source before the case is asserted as fact. Two illustrative rows are pre-filled from the public record; the rest are to be supplied by the initiative and merged. **Do not publish a row whose "Source / evidence" cell is empty.**

No.	Allegation / matter (as documented)	Period	Source / evidence (required)	Status
1	Broad amnesty pardoned 40 SPAK-convicted persons; 65 sentences reduced — a documented reversal of anti-corruption enforcement.	2024	EC 2024 Albania Report, SWD(2024) 690. [1]	Sourced
2	Public designation of a former Prime Minister for "significant corruption" (7031(c)); PNG later lifted (2026).	2021 / 2026	US Dept. of State designation; Balkan Insight (2026). [4]	Sourced
3	— (initiative case: describe the matter factually, no adjectives)	—	— (attach document / link / official act)	Pending
4	—	—	—	Pending
...	... up to 111 (add rows)	...	...	...

Ky është regjistri i strukturuar për rastet (deri 111) e nismës. Çdo rresht duhet të ketë një burim publik para se rasti të pohohet si fakt. Mos publikoni asnjë rresht me qelizën "Burim/provë" bosh.

C.5 Sources

C.5 Burimet

[1] European Commission, Albania 2024 Report, SWD(2024) 690 final, 30.10.2024. enlargement.ec.europa.eu (Albania Report 2024). Key-findings summary: europeanwesternbalkans.com, 31.10.2024.

[2] GRECO, Fifth Round Evaluation Report on Albania (preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments and law enforcement), Council of Europe. coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/albania; summary at eucrim.eu.

[3] International Monetary Fund and contemporaneous reporting on the 1996–97 Albanian pyramid-scheme collapse (nominal value ~USD 1.2bn, ~half of GDP) and the 1997 unrest (~2,000 deaths). Widely documented; to be pinned to a specific IMF working paper / news archive before publication.

[4] U.S. Department of State, "Public Designation of Albanian Sali Berisha Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption" (Section 7031(c)), 19 May 2021, 2021-2025.state.gov; status subsequently lifted — Balkan Insight, 12 June 2026.

[5] INSTAT, Albanian Population and Housing Census 2023 (resident population 2,402,113); 1989 census 3,182,417; 2011 census 2,831,741; decline of 429,628 (~15.2%) since 2011. instat.gov.al; see also Demographics of Albania (compiled census series).

Editorial note (not part of the public text)

Source [3] should be pinned to a specific citation before filing. The initiative's ~111-case register replaces the placeholder rows in C.4 as it is supplied; each incoming case must arrive with its source. Institution addressees and submission channels in Part B should be confirmed against each body's current intake page at the time of filing.