



THE ALBANIAN RENEWAL (RINISJA SHQIPTARE) · DOCUMENT 3

THE WHITE PAPER

The White Paper

English edition of “Dokumenti i Bardhë”

Constitutional restructuring, transatlantic anchoring, and the dismantling of patronage monopolies

KUSHTETUTË E RE

SISTEMI I ZVICRËS – DEMOKRACIA E DREJTPËRDREJTË

— REVOLUCIONI I POPULLIT. FUQIA ËSHTË TE TI. —

DEMOCRACI E DREJTPËRDREJTË
Populli vendos përmes referendumeve dhe iniciativave popullore.

REFERENDUM DHE INICIATIVË POPULLORE
Çdo qytetar ka zërin e tij.

SHTET LIGJOR DHE TRANSPARENT
Të gjithë janë të barabartë para ligjit

MBROJTJA E TË DREJTAVE DHE LIRIVE THEMELORE
Dinjtet i njeriut, liria dhe drejtësia janë të paprekshme.

FIRMOS PETICIONIN TANI!

ÇDO FIRMË ËSHTË NJË VOTË PËR TË ARDHMEN TONË!

FIRMOS ONLINE
PËR TË ARDHMEN E RE

<https://ia-see.com/lexo/>

— AS NARTA · AS RRJOLLI · AS MALET —

TË VONUAR JEMI – MË TË MIRËN TË ZGJEDHIM!

WIRTSCHAFTSUNION
ÖSTERREICH - ALBANIEN

BE

IASEE-RISE

USA

SCHWEIZ

NJË E ARDHMË ME DREJTËSI, LIRI DHE DINJITET!

Author: Naskë Afezollu — former Deputy Minister (1991–1993), Humphrey Fellow, originator of the TAP concept · IASEE-RISE

IA-SEE — RISE · Iniciativa Qytetare · ia-see.com/lexo/ · ia-see.com/peticioni

June 2026

ia-see.com/lexo/ · ia-see.com/peticioni · 1

This White Paper sets out a citizens' renewal of Albania's constitutional order: a new constitution, written by citizens and adopted directly by the people, replacing a captured system with a Swiss-style direct democracy. It is a lawful, peaceful and internationally anchored route, fully committed to the standards of the European Union and the Council of Europe.

One movement, two tracks: every Albanian can sign the civic petition (Track 1 — demonstrates the will); Albanian citizens can add a verified CEC signature — at home directly, abroad after CEC registration (Track 2 — requests the vote). Only the referendum is the decision; the tracks stay separate.

1. Executive Summary and Core Purpose

The IASEE–RISE initiative is not a request for cosmetic reform, nor a vehicle for regime change within the existing framework. It is a sovereign citizens' intervention, designed to lawfully close the 1998 constitutional cycle, to dissolve a parliament that the initiative considers captured by a cross-party cartel, and to replace it with a Swiss-style direct democracy, ratified directly by the people through a binding referendum.

The initiative's assessment is that Albania's difficulties are structural and not accidental: public posts, procurements and licences are often distributed according to political loyalty rather than merit; the meritocratic administration has been eroded; and the country has suffered severe depopulation, with the resident population falling from **3,182,417 (1989 census) to 2,402,113 (2023 census)** — a loss of about 780,000 residents, of which 429,628 (~15.2%) since 2011, principally through emigration.¹ The proposed solution is not a change of leaders, but a change of foundations — making betrayal of the public interest structurally impossible.

2. About the Author

Naskë Afezulli brings to this movement a lifetime of strategic infrastructure delivery — technical and economic credibility, not political opportunism:

1. **Infrastructural sovereignty (1974–1991):** led the design and implementation of the 400 kV Albania–Greece and 220 kV Albania–Kosovo interconnection lines, breaking the country's energy isolation in 1985.
2. **The TAP vision (2003):** conceived and advanced the Southern Gas Corridor (Trans Adriatic Pipeline), presenting the project directly to the U.S. Department of State (Amb. Richard Morningstar) and seeking the support of the German government (former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher).
3. **State service (1991–1993):** served as Deputy Minister during the post-communist transition without ever joining any party; he later qualified in macroeconomics and transition finance as a "Humphrey Fellow" in the USA.

3. Diagnosis: A Captured State

The initiative argues that the current model is not a poorly functioning democracy, but a captured network of nepotistic and oligarchic interests reproduced since 1991. The public administration, on this assessment, is filled with loyalty rather than competence; posts, tenders and licences are distributed as patronage; meritocracy is eroded; and public wealth is plundered while a generation emigrates. These concerns coincide with the rule-of-law and institutional themes that regularly arise in international assessments of the region.

The initiative also holds that Albania's national interest — including stronger ties with Kosovo and resilience against undue foreign influence — is better secured through meritocratic, transparent and accountable institutions than through any single political machine.

4. The Transition: Avoiding the "Iceland Trap"

The framework adapts the methodology of Iceland's citizens' assembly (2010–2013), but adds strict safeguards to avoid its failure. Iceland returned the citizens' draft to the existing, captured parliament for approval — which

blocked it. The Albanian Renewal removes this veto through a binding popular referendum and international anchoring.

Mobilisation (0–3) → Anchoring (1–6) → Assembly (3–9) → Ratification (9–12) → Cantonisation (12–18) → New State (18–24).

1. Citizen mobilisation (months 0–3): gathering signatures to create a sovereign popular mandate.
2. International anchoring (months 1–6): a formal request for oversight by the USA, Switzerland and the EU (the Venice Commission).
3. Constitutional assembly (months 3–9): citizens selected by lot, with non-partisan experts, draft the new text transparently.
4. Binding ratification (months 9–12): national referendum; a “YES” vote dissolves the old parliament.
5. Cantonisation (months 12–18): full decentralisation on the Swiss model and the Council of Senior Experienced Persons (over 60, after vetting).
6. The new state operational (months 18–24): first national elections on a basis of merit and integrity.

The Caretaker Technical Government

Instead of a “temporary governing board,” the transition is administered by a Caretaker Technical Government whose authority derives directly from the people’s sovereign decision in the binding referendum (Articles 2 and 150 of the Constitution in force), not from any emergency regime. Composition: independent, non-partisan experts (including foreign technicians), under international oversight; no active politicians and — to preserve its independence — no sitting member of parliament or member of the outgoing legislature; no persons convicted by final judgment or declared “non grata.” Until it is sworn in, the incumbent Council of Ministers carries out only ordinary administration, so that no vacuum is created. The mandate is limited to day-to-day administration and organising the first elections — no new laws or policies, no budgetary changes beyond continuity, no concessions, privatisations or mass dismissals; duration no more than 6–12 months, non-renewable; it dissolves automatically (ipso jure) once the first elected government is sworn in, and its members do not stand in the first elections.

5. The New Constitution: Principles

The new constitution is not a repair of the 1998 document, but a sovereign restart of the state, written and ratified directly by citizens. Its pillars:

- **Sovereignty of the people** — all power flows from the people and returns to the people.
- **Ban on patronage** — the distribution of posts, tenders or licences on the basis of political loyalty is a constitutional violation.
- **Compulsory meritocracy** — public employment and procurement only through open, transparent competition.
- **Cantonal decentralisation** — power and budgets descend to the cantons and municipalities.
- **Citizen correctives** — citizen-initiative referendums, constitutional recall and real-time fiscal transparency.

6. The New Constitution: Architecture of Power

A. Executive — the Governing Board

A Governing Board of 3 members replaces the single Prime Minister (the main point of state capture). The chair rotates each year (primus inter pares); members are elected directly on non-partisan lists. This removes the cult of personality and makes capture of the executive far harder.

B. Legislature — a 100-seat parliament, all elected

A firm principle: every seat is won by vote. No seat is filled by appointment or by a quota from above. The 100 seats are divided among four open electoral colleges that guarantee broad representation:

- 60 seats — the general citizens’ college.

- 15 seats — science, culture and academia.
- 15 seats — education.
- 10 seats — the diaspora, voted by the diaspora itself.

The right to stand belongs to the individual, not the party. Every citizen meeting transparent, objective and verifiable criteria may self-declare as a candidate in one of the colleges, without any party's approval; no party and no body may block a qualified candidate; qualification is verified by an independent electoral authority under the same rules for all. All citizens vote for each college with equal weight — the colleges determine who may stand, not who may vote (the diaspora college being the exception). Mandates last four years, with early popular recall.

The reasoning: no single organisation should be able to monopolise access to power or turn candidacy into an instrument of patronage. The wall against capture is not a ban on people, but the removal of any machine's power to decide who is allowed to run.

C. Judiciary — elected, not appointed

Judges are not appointed by parliament and do not depend on it. Each position in the Constitutional Court and the High Court is filled directly by referendum, a separate vote for each position — breaking the chain of appointments that made the judiciary capturable. So that quality and independence are protected simultaneously, an independent qualification commission (not parliament, not the parties) selects a shortlist of qualified candidates for each position, on objective criteria of integrity, competence and experience; then the people choose among them by referendum, uniting merit with popular legitimacy. Mandates are long and non-renewable, removing the pressure of re-election that endangers independence. (A fully open variant was examined — each qualified candidate directly to the vote, without a shortlist; the shortlist model was chosen for stronger quality guarantees and closer alignment with the Venice Commission's standards.) The Prosecutor General becomes independent and protected from political interference.

7. The Citizen's Direct Correctives

Three mechanisms place decisive power in citizens' hands:

- **Binding citizen-initiative referendums** — a popular veto over major laws, constitutional amendments and the national budget.
- **Constitutional recall** — any senior official may be recalled directly by the people through an expedited procedure.
- **Real-time fiscal transparency** — every public contract, official salary and fund is published automatically.

8. Cantonal Decentralisation

Today decisions and money are concentrated in Tirana. The cantonal model returns them close to citizens — local budgets and decisions, taken where people live. To avoid fragmentation and local capture, cantons are built initially as a reorganisation of the existing 12 counties (qarqe) under the current decentralisation law, with fiscal self-governance. Cantonal prosecutors and police chiefs are not appointed locally, but controlled centrally by SPAK, so that decentralisation does not turn into capture by local strongmen. The archaic term “pleqësi/bajrak” is replaced by the Council of Senior Experienced Persons (over 60, after vetting): citizen advisory chambers and community courts of mediation and reconciliation under the principle of subsidiarity — within European standards.

9. Political Pluralism and the Question of Parties

This is the most internationally scrutinised part of the plan, so the initiative sets out its position openly and within European standards. The new order is built on open candidacy and direct decision-making: citizens vote for individuals and issues, not party machines. The main protection against capture is the open right of candidacy — since every qualified individual may run without any party's permission, no party can monopolise access to power.

Freedom of political organisation and pluralism are protected for the future, in line with Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Copenhagen criteria. Any transitional measure affecting existing political structures will be limited, proportionate, time-bound and subject to review by the Venice Commission. The aim is structural resilience against the single-party patronage monopoly — achieved by removing the gatekeeping power, not by suppressing organisation.

Party standards: not a ban on parties, but decriminalisation and transparency — a lifetime candidacy bar only for any person convicted by final judgment or declared “non grata” (including their structures); 100% transparent financing; no business money in campaigns. The measures are tied to conviction, not to mere investigation, to respect the presumption of innocence and proportionality under the ECHR.

10. International Anchoring and Commitment to EU/CoE Standards

The entire process is anchored from the outset in external institutions, which compensate for internal weaknesses and guard against manipulation by the captured forces:

- **The Venice Commission** — technical authority and overseer of the constitutional drafting.
- **The European Union** — accession conditionality tied directly to implementation of the new constitution.
- **The United States** — strategic support and monitoring.
- **Switzerland** — expertise in direct democracy and the cantonal system.

The initiative expressly commits to the rule of law, political pluralism, the ECHR and the Copenhagen criteria, and asks that the process unfold under the review of the Venice Commission and in line with the fundamentals cluster of accession (the rule of law, fundamental rights, democratic institutions).

11. Why This Model Will Succeed

Dimension	Iceland (2010–2013)	The IASEE–RISE model	Advantage
Who drafts it	Sortition forum + drafters	Sortition forum + non-partisan experts	Equal
The executive	Single Prime Minister	Board of 3 (annual rotation)	Albania
Route to office	Traditional parties	Citizen petition, sortition, non-partisan vote	Albania
Ratification	Advisory referendum (parliament’s veto)	Binding popular referendum	Decisive
State structure	Centralised unitary state	Deep decentralisation (cantons + Tirana)	Albania
External anchor	None	Venice Commission, EU, USA	Albania

Strategic addendum — three complementary pillars

As a complement to the White Paper, three pillars are added that make the offer complete — capture-proof institutions together with a prosperity engine:

- **The prosperity engine:** Albania–Kosovo economic integration as a first step before any regional federalising initiative; community banks; a functioning stock exchange; the return of strategic assets to public ownership; and property resolution within a fixed deadline.
- **Transitional justice:** the opening of the regime’s files, the building of memorials, and compensation for the persecuted — within the rule of law and without revenge.
- **Sourcing discipline and proportionality:** every factual claim about specific actors is documented with sources before publication; every transitional measure remains limited, proportionate, time-bound and reviewed by the Venice Commission.

12. Conclusion and Call to Sign

The IASEE-RISE movement rejects violence. It proposes a lawful, peaceful and institutional renewal. If Albania is not to keep emptying, and its young are not to see emigration as the only path, betrayal of the public interest must be made structurally impossible.

Before you sign — read everything.

Every signatory has the right to read the full set before adding their name: this White Paper, the petition, the constitution explainer, and the letter to the Venice Commission (copy: the European Commission). All are public at ia-see.com/lexo.

Sign, share and verify your mandate at: ia-see.com/peticioni

Sources

¹ INSTAT, Population and Housing Census 2023 (2,402,113); 1989 census: 3,182,417; 2011 census: 2,831,741; decline of 429,628 (–15.2%) since 2011. [instat.gov.al](https://www.instat.gov.al).

² European Commission, Albania 2024 Report, SWD(2024) 690, 30.10.2024.

³ GRECO, Fifth Round Evaluation Report on Albania, Council of Europe.